by clicking on the page. A slider will appear, allowing you to adjust your zoom level. Return to the original size by clicking on the page again.
the page around when zoomed in by dragging it.
the zoom using the slider on the top right.
by clicking on the zoomed-in page.
by entering text in the search field and click on "In This Issue" or "All Issues" to search the current issue or the archive of back issues respectively.
by clicking on thumbnails to select pages, and then press the print button.
this publication and page.
displays a table of sections with thumbnails and descriptions.
displays thumbnails of every page in the issue. Click on a page to jump.
allows you to browse through every available issue.
FCW : February 2015
It’s no secret that HealthCare.gov failed to work as advertised when it launched in October 2013. The site’s high-profile flop is cited as part of the recruiting pitch for the government’s high-tech rescue squad, the U.S. Digital Service. Behind the over-stressed, crash- prone website was a rushed pro- curement strategy that failed to yield meaningful competition, faulty and undocumented acquisition planning, lack of control over and coordination of contractors, and contract- ing methods that increased the risk of cost overruns, according to a new report from the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General. The result wasn’t merely a buggy website, according to the report. Cost estimates on the six largest contracts associated with HealthCare.gov were pegged at $464 million when the awards were made beginning in 2011. By early 2014, the contract value had nearly doubled to $824 million. One particularly ill-fated move was the decision to conduct the procure- ment under an existing contract used by the Centers for Medicare and Med- icaid Services to acquire IT systems. The 16 companies on CMS’ Enter- prise System Development contract were the only firms allowed to bid on developing the five major compo- nents of HealthCare.gov. Only one firm — CGI Federal — submitted a quali- fied bid for the Federally Facilitated Marketplace (FFM), HealthCare.gov’s center for insurance plan comparison and shopping. The FFM proved to be particularly problematic at launch and required extensive redesign. During the race to repair the site, CGI Fed- eral was put under the supervision of a lead contractor before being taken off the project in January 2014. Two other key contracts — for the $68 million Data Services Hub that routed eligibility queries to govern- ment databases and the $109 million identity-proofing service — attracted only two qualified bids each. The IG report states that contracting officials did not consult government databases on vendors’ past perfor- mance when awarding the FFM and Data Services Hub con- tracts. And just two of the six biggest contracts got a second look from the CMS Contract Review Board before awards were made. CMS risked taking on additional costs by using cost-reimbursement for some of the largest con- tracts. Furthermore, the justification for that deci- sion was limited to “general statements that fixed-price contracts could not be used because costs could not be defined accurately due to uncer- tainties with the required work,” the report states. The report is also critical of the deci- sion not to choose a lead integrator for the biggest HealthCare.gov contracts, considering the size and complexity of the project. Former CMS CIO Tony Trenkle told the IG’s office that CGI Federal was perceived to be the lead contractor, but the report states that “the company did not have the same understanding of its role.” In reply to comments filed in November 2014, when CMS officials reviewed the report, CMS Administra- tor Marilyn Tavenner and HHS Chief Financial Officer Ellen Murray con- curred with the auditors’ conclusions. “CMS is taking the HHS OIG’s findings and recommendations seriously and is using the report as an opportunity to make needed change,” they wrote. By most accounts, the HealthCare. gov site is functioning smoothly as the second open-enrollment period winds down. Accenture, the contractor tapped in January 2014 to take over the FFM, recently won a five-year, $563 million contract to run the FFM through 2020. — Adam Mazmanian February 2015 FCW.COM 11 26 IG details flaws in HealthCare.gov IT acquisition CMS Administrator Marilyn Tavenner concurred with the IG’s report on the botched HealthCare.gov acquisition. INK TANK APIMAGES data centers have been closed by Lawrence Livermore National Lab, saving nearly $350,000 annually 0215fcw_003-011.indd 11 1/27/15 2:39 PM
March 15, 2015